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This issue of the IDS Bulletin has been produced
by the Project Planning Centre for Developing
Countries of the University of Bradford, England,
whose main work since 1970 has been to run
courses in project appraisal for nationals from
the Third World. The contents reflect the Centre's
concern not only with the techniques of project
appraisal but also with the social and political
issues raised by using them.
Planning techniques such as project appraisal or
mathematical programming are means to assist
decision-making in conditions of incomplete
information: there is no way of controlling the
weather so that agricultural yields can be
predicted with certainty, of estimating the likely
success of trade unions in raising the real wages
of their members, or of predicting technological
changes in the electronics industry in the coming
lO years.
Project appraisal can be defined as any planning
technique where investment decisions are taken
one by one: it is decentralised in space and time.
Consequently project appraisers operate with a
special form of uncertainty: they do not know
what other projects will be accepted in the future.
By contrast, mathematical programmers attempt
to plan all the investments that will be made in a
defined time period simultaneously: this means
that they require accurate technical and price
information for every possible alternative invest-
ment or combination of investments, so that their
plans very quickly become out of date. The
macro-economic plans produced for the past 30
years in the mixed economies of both the
developed and the underdeveloped worlds were
neither of these: for often the planners had little
control over those who took the actual decisions
to invest, so that the so-called plans were little
more than lists of half-prepared suggestions
prevented as bait to persuade aid donors or the
private sector that it was worth investing.
As with any decentralised planning system, project
planning has two stages: establishing the rules
1 In this issue where the author-date system ¡s
used, full details of references are given in the
Select Bibliography on Project Planning on page
36. For a few references of less general interest
details have been footnoted.
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to be followed by the decentralised agents, and
using those rules to appraise actual projects. The
theory of marginal cost pricing worked out by
Pigou and others in the 1920s showed that an
optimal use of resources would not necessarily
be achieved by charging to cover costs: overall
welfare could often be improved by subsidising a
railway or a bridge out of taxation. Moreover
much of the benefit might accrue to individuals
who were unwilling or unable to pay for it, such
as those relieved from congestion on other parts
of a transport network. These two insights
continue to form the substance of cost-benefit
analysis in advanced capitalist economies: in
making investment decisions, costs should be
long-run marginal costs, while benefits or ccsts
accruing to individuals as a result of a project but
not actually paid for should be included in the
calculations.
Although the methodology was devised to deal with
these problems of public sector investment in
infrastructure and transport in developed capitalist
economies, it was recognised that some of the
problems facing planners in the underdeveloped
world were similar. In particular, if the alternative
to wage employment was either unemployment,
or employment in an activity that contributed
very little to national output, there was a case
for valuing labour below the market wage-rate.
Despite warnings about the danger of doing this
in an advanced economy (Prest and Turvey in
their influential 1965 survey pointed out that it
might make a very large number of projects
'profitable') economists evaluating projects for
foreign aid donors started using a shadow price
of labour equal to the marginal product in
peasant agriculture. They also recognised that
most governments valued a dollar of foreign
exchange more highly than they valued its
equivalent in local currency at the official
exchange rate, and so they revalued foreign
exchange earnings or savings using a shadow
exchange rate. The resulting ad hoc system of
project appraisal, while never very well docu-
mented in the academic literature, was widely
used in actual project appraisals in the 1960s,
and remains in frequent use to this day.
The premium imposed on foreign exchange was
fairly arbitrary: it was customary to argue that
it could be calculated by estimating the
devaluation that would be required to equate the
demand and supply of foreign exchange without
any need for controls. This procedure was, for
example, recommended by Roemer and Stern
whose book was published as recently as 1975.
The difficulty with it is that 'balance' in the
foreign exchange markets cannot be defined
unless government policy, the size of the invest-
ment budget, and the desire to move capital in
or out of that country are all known.
The concept of a foreign exchange premium was
eventually given precision by development in the
theory of trade. Economists who were convinced
that many import substitution projects were being
implemented in the misconceived belief that they
would save foreign exchange, devised the concept
of effective protection to reveal the cost of
industrialising behind protective tariffs. In 1968
and 1972 this concept was extended in two
systems of project appraisal, usually referred to
as 'Little and Mirrlees' and 'UNIDO', in which
production of goods that could be externally
traded was only justified if they could be produced
more cheaply than their inputs. Output and traded
inputs were valued at world prices, i.e., excluding
tariffs. Non-traded goods were valued according
to their opportunity costs. Both of these systems
therefore required a ratio, equivalent to a shadow
price of foreign exchange, in order to compare
the world prices of traded goods with the oppor-
tunity cost prices, based on local prices, of
non-traded goods (although the Little and
Mirrlees system went out of its way to recom-
mend that, as far as possible, this ratio should be
calculated separately for each non-traded good).
Both systems also allowed for the fact that a very
low shadow price of labour might lead to the
choice of labour intensive projects which would
not be the projects generating the greatest
profits for their owners, so that their implementa-
tion would lower the capacity of the economy
to reinvest out of profits; so in countries where
growth was emphasized as well as the need to
raise consumption and employment immediately,
a somewhat higher shadow wage was recom-
mended.
The similarity between the Little-Mirrlees and
UNIDO methods was recognised at once
(Dasgupta 1972). In 1975 John Weiss demon-
strated precisely the assumptions required to make
the two systems give the same answers. In his
contribution in this issue he shows how the
demands of an empirical study in Pakistan made
it virtually impossible to calculate the shadow
price of each non-traded good separately, so that
he was left with little alternative but to use an
approximation mathematically equivalent to the
UNIDO procedure.
In 1975, as part of a new policy of emphasizing
'basic needs', the World Bank published a mono-
graph by Lyn Squire and Herman van der Tak
which recommended giving greater weight to
income streams accruing to those whose incomes
were below a critical level. The procedure
had been suggested 15 years earlier (Eckstein
1961; see also Layard 1972: 57-9); some
of the problems had also been pointed out
(Freeman 1967). The attraction was the
mathematical convenience, which depended on
only two value judgements to measure the extent
to which income going to the poor should be
revalued (Potts 1977). The issues are discussed
in the essays in this collection by Mike Veitch
and David Potts, and in several articles in the
symposium on 'Cost-Benefit Analysis and Income
Distribution in Developing Countries', edited by
John MacArthur and Gala! Amin, recently
published as a special issue of World Development
(Vol. 6, no. 2, February 1978).
Theoretically there is no limit to the number of
objectives that can be taken into account in a
system of shadow prices. The project appraiser
merely asks his sponsor to list his objectives in
a form that can be measured numerically, together
with the relative weights to be given to each
objective. If a government is unwilling to commit
itself to an objective function in this way, then
the appraiser will attempt to impute it, by
studying that government's actual behaviour; for
example, the treatment it gives to different classes
of income receivers in its taxation policies, or the
amount of sacrifice of profit it is prepared to
make to enable a labour intensive solution to
have priority over a capital intensive one.
The practical difficulties of operating such a
system should not be exaggerated. In at least 10
countries, mostly in Asia and Africa, researchers
have calculated systems of shadow prices. In
none of these countries are they, as yet, used
routinely for all project evaluations. But in
principle once the shadow prices have been
calculated, planning offices can keep up-dating the
lists, in which case the application is little more
than arithmetic.
Conceding that the practical problems can be
overcome, would this be a good use of govern-
ment time? Hugh Latimer has no doubt on the
matter: his essay in this issue suggests that
project planning is the only methodology with the
flexibility to take account of changing circum-
stances and emphases in government policy, and
so predicts that it will take over much of the
ground r't present occupied by medium-term
macro-economic planning: indeed, he presents
evidence that this is happening already.
3
But many difficulties remain, as even he admits,
and as John Weiss in his two book reviews and
Michael Veitch and David Potts in their articles
point out. These difficulties divide into three
groups.
There are, first, difficulties with projects them-
selves. This is a problem whether or not shadow
prices are used. For example, Alec Baird in his
article reflects on a very fundamental issue that
faced an integrated rural development project in
Sierra Leone: should it emphasize credit and
confine its activities to a minority of wealthier
farmers who could be expected to repay what was
lent to them? or should it emphasize extension,
in which case it would run its credit activities at
a loss? or should it combine both objectives?
The potential contradiction was not seen in
advance. Frank Wilson describes the problems
of building an evaluation framework into a dairy
development project in Nigeria when achievement
of one objective might make it more difficult to
achieve another. Andrew Coulson's paper on a
grain storage project in Tanzania is a study of
what John White calls 'the aid relationship'. It
shows how during a lengthy negotiation period
the limitations of a project were appreciated by
junior economists in both the recipient's and the
donor's civil services, but how their seniors on
both sides were unwilling to disturb the negotia-
tions by suggesting anything that might cause yet
more delay, with the result that a very bad project
was approved and imp1emented.
This failure of projects to produce what they
promise is a very general problem. Michael Lipton
refers to it in his recent book Why Poor People
Stay Poor (Lipton 1976). In chapter 8 he claims
repeatedly, on the basis of very limited informa-
tion (notably Szczepanik 1969), that investment
in agriculture produces greater returns than invest-
merit elsewhere. Yet at the end of his book he gets
near to undermining his argument when he
explains that 'despite theoretical and empirical
evidence that productive outlays in labour-
intensive small farming show high returns, the
World Bank in particular has found difficulty in
identifying good projects within that sector, or
when evaluating past projects there, in demonstra-
ting satisfactory yields' (p. 349). Although he
gives reasons why rural projects might fail more
often than urban ones, his argument is far from
convincing. 'Why projects fail' is evidently an
area calling for a great deal more research, of
an interdisciplinary nature.
The second general type of problem with project
appraisal relates to the difficulty of tracing all the
effects of a project through the economy. This is
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connected with the problem of putting a boundary
around a project: if one is to apply the
methodology one has to put a limit on the types
of impact that will be considered. A discussion of
this question of externalities has been provided
by Stewart (1977), who points out that they will
be more important for big projects in small
countries, and more important if a whole group
of projects, or a whole category of expenditure,
is being compared, than if one small project is
involved. Thus social cost-benefit analysis is most
useful for evaluating relatively small projects in
a country where strategy is clearly defined. It is
potentially misleading if it is used to evaluate a
proposed change in policy, or to compare one
strategy with another. In industries with large
numbers of interlinkages it will fail to pick up all
the relevant price changes; for example a new
power station may make electricity cheaper and
this would affect the prices of a wide range of
non-traded goods. A similar problem arises if a
rise in the price of food will raise the shadow
wage and so affect the shadow price of every
non-traded good (Mirrlees 1978: 135). In theory
these problems, and others like them, should be
handled by solving a general equilibrium system
in which the government would maximise a
suitable objective function subject to given
technical conditions, and constraints on the
availability of resources, so that for every good
there would be a resulting shadow price. The
set of projects that maximised 'profit' with these
shadow prices would be the ones chosen for
implementation. Although in the literature this
is frequently mentioned as the desirable procedure,
cost-benefit planners are far from making it
operational.
The third type of difficulty, and arguably the most
fundamental of all, concerns the relation of
project appraisal techniques to the interests of
those who use them. Recent innovations in
project appraisal procedure have reflected policy
interests that were topical at the time. Thus the
Little-Mirrlees and UNIDO systems were elabora-
tions of the idea of effective protection designed
to demonstrate the irrationality of much import
substitution. The use of a shadow price of labour
was devised to show the advantage of labour
intensive technology in a dualistic economy.
Income distribution weighting was taken off the
shelf where it lay for 15 years in response to a
sudden realisation by the World Bank and other
Western interests that they had to do something
to improve the conditions of life of the poorest
20 per cent of the world's population.
On the other hand, no-one appears to have
followed up Marglin's suggestion (1967:85) that
self-sufficiency should be incorporated as an
objective. Yet there must be at least as many
statements by Third World governments in
favour of self-reliance, in the sense of minimising
dependence on imports, as there are about income
distribution. This omission may be connected
with an over-reaction against faulty import
substitution, which has left many economists
with an instinctive distrust of the idea that the
medium-sized countries of Africa and Asia should
industrialise. If, however, a country chooses to
make industrialisation a major part of its
economic strategy, it may require, for a generation
or so, considerable protection, and in particular
a general limitation on the imports of consumer
goods and many intermediate goods too. There
would still be trade, notably the export of primary
products and, where possible, manufactured
goods; but the foreign exchange so generated
would be used to purchase capital goods to
establish the industries producing a small number
of key intermediate items, around which the
production of the consumer goods that would
meet the needs of the masses would be based.
Much of the initial risk would be taken by the
State. This is, in essence, the strategy recom-
mended by the Caribbean economist, Clive Y.
Thomas, whose book, reviewed in this issue by
David Phillips, came out in 1974 but has not
received the attention it deserves. This strategy is
not easily compatible with comparative advantage,
at least in the short run. If India had not started
building relatively inefficient steelworks 20 years
ago, she would not now be in a position to export
them to Africa. One wonders if either steelworks
or railway locomotives would have been selected
for investment if comparative advantage had been
the main criterion.
Clive Thomas argues that in this situation, during
a period of socialist industrial and agricultural
transformation, the important planning decisions
concern the timing and sequencing of investments,
so that the output of one project can provide the
input to another at the right time and place.
Shadow prices would be highly unstable over
time, since if a good was in temporary surplus its
shadow price would be very low, while if it was
in shortage, pending the completion of a new
capacity, its shadow price would be very high.
In such conditions, or in a war econQmy, many
more variables would be under the control of the
planners, and there would be a strong case for
the use of mathematical programming methods
in place of project appraisal based on shadow
pricing.
But what of the majority whose governments
have little wish to carry out this sort of strategy,
or even much more limited programmes of land
reform or income redistribution? David Potts,
elaborating an argument hinted at by Amartya
Sen in his important 1972 Economic Journal
article asserts that project appraisal is a technique
devised and favoured by planners and donors who
would like the governments of the Third World
lo change their policies but who fear that they
will not do so. In Potts' words:
Through the internal logic of economic theory
(or just from an idea of human justice) it is
apparent that, in many countries, there is
insufficient overall saving and insufficient
consumption by the poorest people. One reason
is that the rich (and the army) consume and
waste too much and invest too little in produc-
tive activity. Social analysis can therefore be
seen as an attempt by economists (and the aid
agencies that finance their work) to impose
this logic on countries that would otherwise do
very little. . . . while government statements are
sometimes used to back the judgements up, they
really constitute an attempt to impose the
priorities of economic planners and aid agencies
on recalcitrant governments, for a variety of
different motivessuch as humanitarianism and
the desire to promote political stabilityor
prevent revolution.
His defence of the technique then amounts to
the suggestion that more good is likely to come
out of its use than harm. Alternatively, its use
might simply legitimise a regime in which power
was held by a local ruling class in alliance wth
Western interests, with the welfare of the masses
very low on its list of objectives.
The reader of the articles in this issue will
perceive that, just as many technical issues are
unresolved, different views prevail about the role
and value of important elements of project
planning, such as social cost benefit analysis.
Thus, several of the book reviews make the
point that the use of any planning technique
cannot be separated from the interests of those
who use it. John Weiss, in his review of a book
on private investment overseas, affirms that 'there
is sufficient evidence . . . for the view that the
interests of host countries and globally oriented
multinationals can often diverge'; David Philips,
reviewing Clive Thomas' book on industrial
transformation, shows how the use of project
appraisal methods cannot be separated from the
choice of strategy; while Ken Westgate's review
of a book on famine suggests that the pursuit of
profit has led to agricultural systems which do
not ensure that people get fed. The final review
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is of a novel, Petals of Blood, by the Kenyan
writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o. African writers, such
as Sembene Ousmane, Chinua Achebe, and Ngugi
have used the novel to raise questions about the
nature of their post-colonial states that they could
not raise in any other way. Placed in this
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collection, the review serves to remind us that
economics cannot be separated from politics, that
the political context in which decisions are made
does more to affect the quality of life of the
masses than the use of any particular planning
technique, whether at the macro or micro level.
